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Abstract.What are the truth conditions of want ascriptions? According
to a highly influential and fruitful approach, championed by Heim (1992)
and von Fintel (1999), the answer is intimately connected to the agent’s
beliefs: ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff within S’s belief set, S prefers the p worlds
to the ¬p worlds. This approach faces a well known and as-yet unsolved
problem, however: it makes the entirely wrong predictions with what we
call (counter)factual want ascriptions, wherein the agent either believes
p or believes ¬p—e.g., ‘I want it to rain tomorrow and that is exactly what
is going to happen’ or ‘I want this weekend to last forever but of course it
will end in a few hours’. We solve this problem. The truth conditions for
want ascriptions are, we propose, connected to the agent’s conditional be-
liefs. We bring out this connection by pursuing a striking parallel between
(counter)factual and non-(counter)factual want ascriptions on the one
hand and counterfactual and indicative conditionals on the other.
1 Introduction
What are the truth conditions of want ascriptions? According to a highly in-
fluential and fruitful approach, championed by Heim (1992) and von Fintel
(1999), the answer is crucially intertwined with the agent’s beliefs—specifically,
with the set of worlds compatible with her beliefs, her belief set. The approach
says, in outline, that ⌜S wants p⌝ is true just if S prefers the p worlds in her be-
lief set to the ¬p worlds in her belief set.1 (Theorists disagree about just what
this preference relation amounts to.)
Originally developed to help account for presupposition projection (Heim,
1992; Geurts, 1998), the belief-set-based approach to want ascriptions has
1The symbol ‘p’ as a variable over syntactic objects that ‘want’ combines with is suggestive
of ‘proposition’, and in this paper we will sometimes informally refer to the semantic values
of those objects as ‘propositions’. But nothing crucial hinges on this: all that matters for us is
that objects of ‘want’ pick out sets of possible worlds. Insofar as prototypical want ascriptions
in English have infinitival complements, we are thereby committed to the claim that infinitives
pick out sets of possible worlds. We also treat objects of ‘believe’, which in English are proto-
typically finite clauses, as picking out sets of possible worlds. While there are some interesting
semantic differences between infinitives and finite clauses, and accordingly, between objects of
want ascriptions and objects of belief ascriptions, both contribute to the truth conditions of the
sentences they inhabit in such a way that they can be fruitfully analyzed as picking out sets of
possible worlds.
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great theoretical power, and scholars continue to develop ever more sophisti-
cated versions of it. As reviewed recently by Phillips-Brown (ms), the belief-set
approach to want ascriptions has been shown to help explain the relationship
betweenwant,wish, and be glad (Heim 1992; see also section 9); the distinc-
tion between so-called ‘predictive’ and ‘advisory’want (Jerzak, 2019); certain
puzzles concerningwish (Blumberg, 2018) and hope (Blumberg ms);2 various
issues raised by Crnič (2011, Appendix A); and the interaction betweenwant
and conditionals (Jerzak, 2019; von Fintel, ms).3
Even given these successes, the belief-set approach faces a well-known
problem: it yields the wrong results for ⌜S wants p⌝ whenever either (i) S be-
lieves p or (ii) S believes ¬p.4 Call an ascription in case (i) a factual want as-
cription: the agent treats p as fact. In case (ii), we use the term counterfactual
want ascription: the agent treats p as contrary to fact.
Example factual want ascription (FWA)5
(1) I want it to rain tomorrow (and I believe it will).
(adapted from Scheffler 2008)
Example counterfactual want ascription (CFWA)
(2) Wu wants to be promoted (but believes he won’t be).
(adapted from Portner and Rubinstein 2012)
Let the umbrella term for FWAs and CFWAs be ‘(counter)factual want ascrip-
tion’, or ‘(C)FWA’.
In section 2, we’ll present the problem of (C)FWAs in greater detail; for
now, we’ll just give you a feel for it, using (2) as an example. According to the
belief-set approach, (2) is true just if Wu prefers the worlds in his belief set
2Blumberg’s puzzles, and his solutions, are concerned with ‘wish’ and ‘hope’, but can be
simply modified to apply to ‘want’.
3Jerzak uses a graded-notion of belief in his semantics, while we concern ourselves in this
paper with the all-out notion of belief found in the belief set; many of the benefits of Jerzak’s
graded-belief semantics can be enjoyed by an all-out-belief semantics. Jerzak also notes that
with certain uses of ‘want’—what he calls the advisory ‘want’—it is not the agent’s beliefs, but
rather those in the context of evaluation or utterance that should figure in the semantics. We
set such uses of ‘want’ to the side.
4Decision-theoretic approaches to want ascriptions (see e.g. Levinson 2003; Lassiter
2011; Phillips-Brown fc) face more or less this same problem. Wrenn (2010) proposes a so-
lution that bears a certain resemblance to our own, although he confines his view to cases of
all-things-considered desire (as opposed to ‘some-things-considered’ desire, in the sense of
Phillips-Brown ms). Our approach, by contrast, is designed to be compatible with some-things-
considered desire, either by bringing in multiple preference rankings (à la Levinson 2003;
Crnič 2011), or by replacing possible worlds with something coarser (see section 7).
5See also Iatridou (2000:243) for several other examples of FWAs.
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where he is promoted to…We needn’t continue any further with the belief-set-
based account, since it’s broken down already: there are no worlds in Wu’s be-
lief set where he’s promoted. He believes that he won’t be promoted!
Theorists have noticed this problem before. Indeed, Heim herself saw it—
and gave us the following, memorable CFWA, (3), below—when she brought
the belief-set-based approach onto the scene.
(3) I want this weekend to last forever (but of course I know it will be over
in a few hours). (Heim 1992, p. 199)
Yet Heim did not venture a solution.6 To our knowledge, only one theorist has:
Rubinstein (2017). But her solution is not satisfactory, as we argue in section 3.
In sections 4–5, we develop a solution of our own—one in which condi-
tional belief is integral to the semantics of ‘want’. Our account is inspired by
a striking parallel between indicative vs. counterfactual conditionals on the
one hand and non-(C)FWAs vs. (C)FWAs on the other. By way of preview, our
proposal, stated informally, is that ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff S prefers what she be-
lieves will (would) happen if p is (were) true to what she believes will (would)
happen if ¬p is (were) true. As we will show, this approach enjoys all the same
virtues of the belief-set-based approach for non-(C)FWAs while endowing
the semantics with just enough flexibility to handle (C)FWAs in a tightly con-
strained way. After presenting our solution, we turn in sections 6–9 to some
further contextualizing considerations and extensions before concluding the
paper.
2 The problem, formalized
We’ll bring the problem of (C)FWAs into clearer view with an instance of the
belief-set-based approach to want ascriptions: von Fintel’s (1999) best-worlds
semantics, which is patterned after Kratzer’s (1981, 1991) classic system of
modals.
We said that on the belief-set-based view, ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff S prefers
the p worlds in her belief set to the ¬p worlds in her belief set. Von Fintel’s se-
6Heim (1992) also noticed the problem of FWAs, with the sentence ‘(John hired a babysitter
because) he wants to go to the movies tonight’ (p. 199). She proposed to solve this problem
by replacing the belief set with the set of worlds “compatible with everything that [the agent]
in [the evaluation world] believes to be the case no matter how he chooses to act.” Insofar as
John’s belief that he will go to the movies tonight is underpinned by his intention to do so, this
particular example is no longer a problem. But this solution does not extend to all factual want
ascriptions, like (1) above.
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mantics exemplifies this view by saying that ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff p is true in
all of the best worlds in S’s belief set, as ranked by S’s preferences.
More formally, let BelS be S’s belief set, and let bestS be a function that
takes a set of worlds Γ and returns the subset of Γ that is best according to S’s
preferences:7
(4) von Fintel’s semantics8JS wants pK = 1 iff ∀w ∈ bestS(BelS):p(w) = 1
Absent any caveats, von Fintel’s semantics would predict that FWAs are
vacuously true: because the agent believes p, there are only p worlds in BelS;
the best worlds in BelS are thus p worlds. Conversely, CFWAs would be vacu-
ously false: because the agent believes ¬p, p worlds are absent from BelS and
thereby absent from BelS’s best worlds.9
In response to this threat of vacuous truth and vacuous falsity, proponents
of the belief-set approach, von Fintel included, have hypothesized that (C)FWAs
suffer from presupposition failure: JS wants pK is undefined whenever S either
believes p or believes ¬p.10 But we already know this to be wrong: the (C)FWAs
in section 1—i.e. (1), ‘I want it to rain tomorrow (and I believe it will)’ and (2),
‘Wu wants to be promoted (but believes he won’t be)’—are intuitively felicitous
and contingent want ascriptions.11
With or without a presuppositional component, then, von Fintel’s seman-
tics goes wrong. Where to go from here? To map a way forward, we propose to
see von Fintel’s semantics as breaking into three assumptions that jointly en-
tail it. Begin with a basic assumption of the best-worlds semantics, one that’s
shared by all of the other belief-set-based semantics, and one that we will pre-
7Letw′ <S wmean thatw′ is better thanw according to S’s preferences: bestS(Γ) =
{w ∈ Γ | ¬∃w′ ∈ Γ:w′ <S w}.
8Wemake an innocuous simplification here: following Heim (1992), von Fintel (1999) ac-
tually uses not BelS as his domain but rather a certain superset of it, Bel∗S, which screens off
S’s beliefs grounded in her own intentions: Bel∗S = {w |w is compatible with what S believes
will happen no matter how she chooses to act}. As discussed in footnote 6, this is in order to
account for a certain species of FWAs in which the agent intends to make it the case that the
desired proposition holds. But since not all FWAs are of this species, the problem of FWAs
persists, as of course does the problem of CFWAs.
9We’re assuming that BelS, and therefore bestS(BelS), is non-empty. If BelS is instead empty,
then counterfactual want ascriptions are vacuously true: all of the best worlds in BelS (there are
none!) are vacuously p worlds.
10The details of this presuppositional component differ by theorist. See e.g. Heim 1992: 198
or von Fintel 1999:117.
11This is not to say that all (C)FWAs are impeccable, and indeed we speculate that compe-
tition from the explicitly counterfactual ‘wish’ and the explicitly factual ‘be glad (that)’ may
render (C)FWAs weakly dispreferred under some conditions. See section 9.
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serve. The assumption is that ‘want’ ascriptions are evaluated against some
domain of worlds, D, and the agent’s preferences are among the worlds in D.
(5) Form of a semantics for ‘want’JS wants pK = 1 iff S prefers the p worlds in D to the ¬p worlds in D.
This form requires us to fill in two elements: what it is for S to prefer p to
¬p in D, and what D is. The belief-set-based view says that D is the belief set:
(6) Belief-set domain
D = BelS
And we can read von Fintel as saying that S prefers the p worlds in D to the
¬p worlds in D just if all of the best worlds in D are p worlds, as ranked by S’s
preferences. Or, more formally:
(7) Best-worlds preference within a domain
S prefers the p worlds in D to ¬p worlds in D iff ∀w ∈ bestS(D):
p(w) = 1.
Together, (5), (6), and (7) entail von Fintel’s semantics. Von Fintel’s se-
mantics must be rejected, and so one of these three views must be rejected.
Certainly one could reject (5) and instead take a different approach to ‘want’.
Some have done so.12 We would like to know if the (C)FWA problem can be
solved—and so the theoretical fruits of the belief-set-based approach enjoyed—
while holding on to (5), and indeed we believe that it can be, as we’ll argue in
section 5.
So: we must reject either either the Belief-set domain (i.e. (6)) or the Best-
worlds preference within a domain (i.e. (7)). Not necessarily (7). While its ad-
equacy is debated, rejecting it is not a solution to the problem of (C)FWAs. If
we were to replace it with something else, like a Heimian notion of preference
within a domain (see section 6), we’d be playing a game of whack-a-mole: the
(C)FWA problem would pop up with its replacement. Out with (6), then—the
domain for (C)FWAs is not the belief set. So what is it? In the next section we
review and argue against Rubinstein’s answer to this question; in sections 4–5
we develop our own.
12For example, the Content Specification version of the so-called Relational Analysis—an
influential semantics in the philosophy literature (Fara, 2013)—quantifies over the agent’s
desires (rather than over some domain of worlds). Similarly, Condoravdi and Lauer (2016)
quantifies over the agent’s preferences.
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3 Against Rubinstein’s domain
Rubinstein (2017) proposes a variant of Heim’s (1992) semantics for want as-
criptions, amended so as to carry out a “relaxed reliance of belief in desire
statements” (p. 110). It is important to note at the outset that Rubinstein’s
framing motivation is not the problem of (C)FWAs, but rather a separate prob-
lem for want ascriptions identified by Villalta (2008), which we have our own
take on and will discuss in due course in section 7. However, as Rubinstein
herself notes, and as we shall see presently, her proposal does have some rel-
evance to (C)FWAs.
Rubinstein offers her proposal as a Heim 1992-style re-implementation of
Villalta’s (2008) context-dependent semantics for want ascriptions. In a nut-
shell, Rubinstein’s proposal is that when we evaluate ⌜S wants p⌝, the domain
is not S’s belief set, but rather a contextually circumscribed domain that is de-
fined only when its intersection with S’s belief set is diverse with respect to p
(in the sense of (Condoravdi, 2002)): that is, (i) its intersection with S’s belief
set and with p is non-empty and (ii) its intersection with S’s belief set and with
¬p is non-empty (p. 117):
(8) Rubinstein’s (2017) Domain for ⌜S wants p⌝
D ∩ BelS ∩ p ̸= ∅ and D ∩ BelS ∩ ¬p ̸= ∅
(where D is contextually circumscribed)
As (8) stands, it will not help with the problem of (C)FWAs, because although
it relaxes the relationship between D and BelS by merely requiring them to
have a non-empty overlap instead of equating them, it still requires non-empty
overlap between BelS and p (dooming CFWAs) and between BelS and ¬p (doom-
ing FWAs). But to give the general idea a fighting chance, it will be instructive
to explore two variations on (8) that remove this requirement while leaving
much of the rest of the proposal intact.
The first variation, suggested to us by [redacted for review] (pers. comm.),
is to revise (8) in such a way that Dmust be diverse with respect to p and D
must have a non-empty overlap with both p and ¬p, but there is no require-
ment imposed directly on the relationship between BelS and p or ¬p, as in (9).
This allows for (C)FWAs.
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(9) Variation 1 on Rubinstein’s (2017) Domain for ⌜S wants p⌝
D ∩ BelS ̸= ∅
D ∩ p ̸= ∅ and D ∩ ¬p ̸= ∅
(where D is contextually circumscribed)
The second variation is to remove any reference whatsoever to BelS. This is sug-
gested by Rubinstein herself: citing Heim’s never-ending weekend sentence
(see (3) above), Rubinstein says “one might…challenge the very assumption
that beliefs semantically restrict desire statements at some level” (p. 119). That
would give us (10), which requires merely that D be diverse with respect to p:
(10) Variation 2 on Rubinstein’s (2017) Domain for ⌜S wants p⌝
D ∩ p ̸= ∅ and D ∩ ¬p ̸= ∅
(where D is contextually circumscribed)
In what follows, we will show that (9) goes wrong because the relationship be-
tween D and BelS is insufficiently constrained. Since (10) leaves that relation-
ship even more unconstrained (in fact, completely unconstrained), it follows
that (10) goes wrong too.
We proceed by first elaborating on what Rubinstein says in prose about
the relationship between D and BelS. Rubinstein suggests that in general, the
relation between D and S’s belief set “may be one of inclusion, such that the
accessible worlds are a superset of the doxastic alternatives, arrived at by po-
tentially suspending some of the subject’s beliefs” (p. 118). This suggestion is
quite similar to Heim’s (1992) reaction to the problem of CFWAs; Heim says,
“maybe for some reason not all the subject’s beliefs are taken into account” (p.
200). We believe that there is something importantly right about this idea. Cru-
cially, though, its ultimate success depends on whether we can answer the fol-
lowing question: what are the rules that govern which worlds D contains, be-
yond those in S’s belief set? Stated differently: what are the rules that tell us
which of S’s beliefs to suspend in arriving at D? Is it really left entirely to con-
text? The only guideline Rubinstein offers is in connection with one particular
example she considers (an example from Heim 1992, ‘I want to teach Tuesdays
and Thursdays next semester’), where she says that the domain consists of “cir-
cumstantially accessible worlds in which I teach next semester… Only a proper
subset of these are the belief worlds of the subject” (p. 118).13 Can we then say
13Rubinstein makes a similar suggestion in earlier work (2012), where, in connection with
Heim’s never-ending weekend sentence, she says (emphasis added), “What such examples
show is that the possibilities that are relevant for a desire statement may be possibilities that
are circumstantially accessible, yet doxastically inaccessible” (p. 116).
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that, in general, D is the union of S’s belief set with some contextually circum-
scribed subset of circumstantially accessible worlds?
This is not right for the problem of (C)FWAs (nor is it right in general).
Imagine, in the promotion case, that Wu is eager for new responsibilities. He
believes that he’d feel invigorated with the tasks required by the higher posi-
tion. (2), ‘Wu wants to be promoted’, is true. But you can easily imagine a way
of filling out Wu’s case so that Rubinstein’s semantics will erroneously predict
that (2) is false. Imagine, for example, a context in which, unbeknownst to Wu,
there are envious assassins, lying in wait, who will poison Wu and his family,
should he be promoted. If (2) is to be predicted true, promotion-worlds must
be best (most desirable to Wu) in D (that’s how the Best-worlds Semantics
works). For Rubinstein, D is BelWu—which doesn’t contain promotion-worlds,
since Wu believes he won’t be promoted—plus contextually circumscribed, cir-
cumstantially accessible worlds in which he is promoted. For Rubinstein, as
with a best-worlds semantics, ⌜S wants p⌝ is true only if p is true in all of the
best worlds in the domain (p. 117). But these circumstantially accessible worlds
in the domain, those that exceed BelWu, are not best; they’re as bad as can be!
In them, Wu and his family are poisoned. (2) is (wrongly) predicted false.
In more general terms, because an agent may be entirely wrong about the
world he inhabits (as e.g. Wu is), contextually circumscribed, circumstantially
accessible worlds (e.g. secret-assassin worlds) may be entirely untethered from
the agent’s beliefs (e.g. Wu may believe as strongly as he believes anything that
there aren’t any secret assassins). Rubinstein’s mistake is allowing D to con-
tain worlds so distant from the agent’s beliefs, since such worlds are in general
irrelevant to what an agent wants.
At this point one might try to salvage Rubinstein’s approach by adjusting
her proposal to be about worlds that are circumstantially accessible, not rela-
tive to the actual world, but rather relative to the agent’s beliefs.14 But this just
duplicates the (C)FWA problem: worlds that one does not believe to be pos-
sible cannot be ones that ones believes are circumstantially accessible—after
all, circumstantial accessibility is realistic in Kratzer’s (1981) sense. What we
need instead for the domain is something more along the lines of “worlds that
the agent believeswould be circumstantially accessible in certain doxastically
counterfactual worlds consistent with the desired proposition.” And this moves
us in the direction we take below.
14In fact, Rubinstein (2017), in footnote 11 on p. 117, mentions the possibility of “[a]nchoring
the modality to the subject,” but does not pursue it.
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4 Interlude: Modeling conditional belief
As we mentioned in the introduction, our solution to the problem of (C)FWAs
makes key use of the agent’s conditional beliefs. To get a handle on just what
we have in mind, we will first propose a certain way of modeling conditional
belief. To be sure, there are myriad ways to understand conditional belief other
than the one we present here (see e.g. Edgington 2014 section 3.1 and refer-
ences therein), and we have no aspirations to supplant them nor to advance a
full-blown theory. We are merely exploring a certain way of seeing conditional
belief that furthers our understanding of the meaning of ‘want’.
Our jumping-off point is Stalnaker’s (1968) system of conditionals, on which
⌜if p, q⌝ is true atw just if q is true at the p world that’s most similar tow, or
Simw(p).15 When ⌜if p, q⌝ is indicative, you can understand Simw(p) as repre-
senting what will happen, relative tow, if p is true. Similarly, when ⌜if p, q⌝ is
counterfactual, Simw(p) represents whatwould happen, relative tow, if p were
true. To cover both cases, say that Simw(p) represents what will (would) hap-
pen if p is (were) true.
Understanding Simw(p) in this way facilitates a parallel understanding of
conditional belief. For eachw in BelS, find the most similar p world tow: col-
lect these p worlds into a set, which we’ll call ‘ConBelS(p)’:16
(11) ConBelS(p) =df {w′ | ∃w ∈ BelS:Simw(p) = w′}
We invite you to understand ConBelS(p) as representing what S believes will
(would) happen if p is (were) true.
We turn now to a further development of Stalnaker’s theory of condition-
als, one that will end up playing a crucial role in our solution to the problem
of (C)FWAs. In particular, Stalnaker (1975) is concerned with the role of con-
ditionals in conversation—with how conditionals interact with the context set
of a conversation, the set of worlds compatible with the presuppositions of the
conversation’s participants. Here’s Stalnaker:
15While the value of Sim is a single world, the work to which we put Sim to use can be done
just as well by a Lewis 1973-style similarity function whose value is a set of worlds.
16We are grateful to [redacted for review] (pers. comm.) for pointing out to us that
ConBelS(p) is essentially the same as what Lewis (1976) would call the “image” of BelS on p.
[redacted for review] also notes that Gardenfors (1982) generalizes Lewis’s notion of imaging
in a way that might enable us to carry out our conditional belief account of want ascriptions
without relying on Stalnaker’s theory of conditionals, though for the sake of concision we do
not explore that option here.
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[I]f the conditional is being evaluated at a world in the context set,
then the world selected must, if possible, be within the context set
as well […] In other words, all worlds within the context set are
closer [i.e. more similar] to each other than any worlds outside it.
The idea is that when a speaker says ‘If A’, then everything he is
presupposing to hold in the actual situation is presupposed to hold
in the hypothetical situation in which A is true. […] it is at least a
normal expectation that the selection function should turn first to
[the worlds in the context set] before considering counterfactual
worlds—those presupposed to be non-actual. (Stalnaker 1975, pp.
275–6)
You can translate Stalnaker’s thought into our formal vocabulary as follows,
where C is the context set:
(12) Stalnaker’s Context Set Constraint
∀w ∈ C,∀p: if C contains p worlds, then Simw(p) ∈ C
Stalnaker uses this constraint to characterize indicative vs. counterfactual con-
ditionals. A conditional ⌜if p, q⌝ is not indicative or counterfactual full stop;
rather, it is counterfactual or indicativewith respect to a context set. ⌜if p, q⌝
is counterfactual with respect to C just if Simw must reach outside C to find a
p world, which according to the constraint, happens only when C doesn’t con-
tain p worlds—that is, when the conversational participants treat p as contrary
to fact. In contrast, ⌜if p, q⌝ is indicative with respect to C when the conversa-
tional participants don’t treat p as contrary to fact.
The belief set, we suggest, is a natural analogue of the context set. The con-
text is the set of worlds compatible with the presuppositions of the conversa-
tional participants—in other words, those worlds that the participants treat as
live possibilities. Similarly, the belief set is the set of worlds compatible with
the beliefs of the agent; in other words, those worlds that the agent treats as
live possibilities.
This analogy between belief set and context set is the foundation for a con-
straint on the belief set that’s analogous to Stalnaker’s Context Set Constraint.
Adapting the passage from Stalnaker:
All worlds within the belief set are more similar to each other than
any worlds outside it. The idea is that when a conditional ‘If A’, is
entertained with respect to the agent’s beliefs, everything the agent
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believes to hold in the actual situation holds in the hypothetical sit-
uation in which A is true. […] it is at least a normal expectation that
the selection function should turn first to the worlds in the belief
set before considering counterfactual worlds—those believed by the
agent to be non-actual.
(us, riffing on Stalnaker)
Formally, we have:
(13) Stalnakerian Belief Set Constraint
∀w ∈ BelS, ∀p: if BelS contains p worlds, then Simw(p) ∈ BelS
Just as Stalnaker used his constraint to characterize indicative and coun-
terfactual conditionals, we will use the Stalnakerian constraint to character-
ize indicative and counterfactual conditional belief. As you know, we repre-
sent an agent’s conditional beliefs about p with ConBelS(p), which abbreviates
{w′ | ∃w ∈ BelS:Simw(p) = w′}.
When S believes ¬p, ConBelS(p) represents S′s counterfactual conditional
beliefs: what S believeswould happen if p were true. This is because when S
believes ¬p—i.e. when BelS contains no p worlds—Simw must reach outside
BelS to find p worlds. In other words, ConBelS(p) is constructed only of worlds
that S believes are contrary to fact.
Conversely, when S’s beliefs are consistent with p, ConBelS(p) represents
S′s indicative conditional beliefs: what S believeswill happen if p is true. That’s
because when S’s beliefs are consistent with p—i.e. when BelS contains p worlds—
the Stalnakerian Belief Set Constraint dictates that ConBelS(p) doesn’t extend
beyond BelS. ConBelS(p) contains only worlds in BelS, which is to say it doesn’t
contain worlds contrary to what S believes is fact.
One note before moving on. We have, following an influential tradition,
characterized the indicative–counterfactual distinction in terms of the context
set. This characterization tends to be rejected, though, by those who under-
stand counterfactuals in terms of the past tense (e.g. Arregui (2007), Ippolito
(2013)). Adopting this alternative understanding may lead one to reject our in-
terpretation (which uses counterfactuals) of the machinery we use below to
construct the domain for ‘want’. But we believe that adopting this alternative
understanding does not thereby give one reason to reject the domain itself, or
the predictions that one gets if one adopts it.
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5 The Conditional-belief Domain: Solving the (C)FWA problem
Equipped with the approach to conditional belief from section 4, we can solve
the problem of (C)FWAs. Recall the basic set-up from section 2. We have three
views that jointly entail von Fintel’s best-worlds semantics:
(5) Form of a Semantics for ‘Want’ (we accept)JS wants pK = 1 iff S prefers the p worlds in D to the ¬p worlds in D.
(6) Belief Set Domain (we reject)
D = BelS
(7) Best-worlds Preference in a Domain (we’re ecumenical)
S prefers the p worlds in D to the ¬p worlds in D iff ∀w ∈ bestS(D):
p(w) = 1.
As we’ve discussed, the solution to the problem of (C)FWAs lies in replacing
the Belief Set Domain. In proposing a replacement below, we presuppose (5).
But we are ecumenical on just what preference within a domain is. Our domain
is compatible with the Best-worlds conception (i.e. (7)) and, for example, with
Heim’s conception (see section 6).
Our domain is the union of ConBelS(p) and ConBelS(¬p). In other words,
the domain represents S’s conditional beliefs about p and S’s conditional be-
liefs about ¬p.
(14) Conditional Belief Domain (our proposal)
D = ConBelS(p) ∪ ConBelS(¬p)
= {w′ | ∃w ∈ BelS:Simw(p) = w′} ∪ {w′ | ∃w ∈ BelS:Simw(¬p) = w′}
This domain works for (C)FWAs and non-(C)FWAs alike. In particular, it makes
the same predictions for non-(C)FWAs as the standard semantics for ‘want’,
while correcting the mistakes of that semantics for (C)FWAs. Below, we’ll ex-
amine non-(C)FWAs and (C)FWAs in turn.
5.1 Non-(C)FWAs
Our truth conditions for non-(C)FWAs turn on the interaction between the
agent’s preferences and her indicative conditional beliefs:
(15) Truth conditions for non-(C)FWAs, informally
If S believes neither p nor ¬p, ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff:
S prefers what she believeswill happen if p is true to what she believes
will happen if p is false.
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For example, suppose that Li is unsure if there are any copies ofWar and Peace
available, and therefore unsure if she will be able to read it. Li neither believes
that she’ll readWar and Peace nor believes that she won’t. And so (16) just be-
low is a non-(C)FWA.
(16) Li wants to readWar and Peace.
On our account, (16) is true just if Li prefers what she believes will happen if
she does (her friends will think she’s an intellectual) to what she believes will
happen if she doesn’t (they’ll think she’s boring).
Here’s how these informal truth conditions capture the formalism above.
Because we’re dealing with a non-(C)FWA, Li’s beliefs are compatible with her
readingWar and Peace and compatible with her not doing so. Both ConBelLi(War)
and ConBelLi(¬War)—i.e. our domain for (16)—are indicative with respect to
BelLi. (WhereWar is the proposition that Li readsWar and Peace.) This is to
say that ConBelLi(War) and ConBelLi(¬War) respectively represent what Li be-
lieves will happen if she readsWar and Peace and what she believes will hap-
pen if she doesn’t.
That’s how the agent’s beliefs enter the picture. Now consider her prefer-
ences. The form of a semantics for ‘want’ that we endorse, (5), says that JS wants pK
= 1 iff S prefers the p worlds in D to the ¬p worlds in D. For us, D is the union
of ConBelS(p) (a set of p worlds) and ConBelS(¬p) (a set of ¬p worlds). The
form of the semantics then becomes this: JS wants pK = 1 iff S prefers the worlds
in ConBelS(p) to the worlds in ConBelS(¬p), which is to say that S prefers the
worlds that represent what she believes will happen if p is true to the worlds
that represent what she believes will happen if p is false. This matches (15).
We’ve said that with non-(C)FWAs, our view makes the same predictions as
the best-set-based view. That’s because with non-(C)FWAs, our domain is the
belief set.
To show this, we’ll first establish a key fact:
(17) If BelS contains p worlds, then ConBelS contains all and only the p worlds
in BelS.
ConBelS(p) contains all the p worlds in BelS because we place a so-called
centering constraint on the Sim function: for any proposition p and worldw,
ifw is a p world, then Simw(p) =w. (See e.g. Stalnaker 1968; the constraint is
motivated by the thought that a world is more similar to itself than to any other
world.) And so ifw is a p world in BelS, thenw is in ConBelS(p).
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ConBelS(p) contains only the p worlds in BelS because of the Stalnakerian
Belief Set constraint. With non-(C)FWAs, there are p worlds in BelS. The Stal-
nakerian Belief Set Constraint then dictates that Simw(p)—and therefore Con-
BelS(p)—never reaches outside of BelS, for allw in BelS. So ifw is a p world in
ConBelS(p), thenw is in BelS.
With (17) established, return to our domain, ConBelS(p) ∪ ConBelS(¬p).
With a non-(C)FWA, there are p worlds in BelS, so ConBelS(p) contains all and
only the p worlds in BelS; with a non-(C)FWA, there are ¬p worlds in BelS, so
ConBelS(¬p) contains all and only the ¬p worlds in BelS. Put these two facts
together and ConBelS(p) ∪ ConBelS(¬p) contains all and only the worlds in
BelS; in other words, our domain for non-(C)FWAs is BelS.
5.2 (C)FWAs
While non-(C)FWAs operate entirely with the agent’s indicative conditional
beliefs, (C)FWAs operate half with the agent’s indicative conditional beliefs
and half with her counterfactual conditional beliefs.
Begin with CFWAs.
(18) Truth conditions for CFWAs, informally
If S believes ¬p, ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff:
S prefers what she believeswould happen if p were true to what she
believeswill happen given that ¬p is true.
Take, for instance, our CFWA from before, (2), repeated below:
(2) Wu wants to be promoted (but he believes he won’t be).
(2) is true just if he prefers what he believes would happen if he were to be
promoted (this is the counterfactual element) to what he believes will happen
given that he won’t be promoted (this is the indicative element17).
These informal truth conditions capture the above formalism as follows.
ConBelWu(Promoted) is counterfactual with respect to Wu’s beliefs because
he believes that he won’t be promoted: ConBelWu(Promoted) represents what
Wu believes would happen if he were to be promoted. And ConBelWu(¬Pro-
moted) is indicative with respect to Wu’s beliefs because his beliefs are com-
patible with the possibility that—in fact, entail that—he won’t be promoted:
17We informally paraphrase the indicative element as “given that he won’t be promoted”
rather than “if he isn’t promoted”, because the latter tends to lead to the inference that the
agent considers it to be possible that he will be promoted, which is not the case since this is a
CFWA. Here and in what follows, we use “given that p” in situations where p is entailed by the
agent’s belief set.
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ConBelWu(¬Promoted) represents what Wu believes will happen given that he
won’t be promoted.
Put another way, ConBelWu(Promoted) ∪ ConBelWu(¬Promoted) consists
of (i) the worlds where Wu is promoted that are maximally similar to worlds
in BelWu and (ii) ConBelWu itself. (i) holds because there aren’t any Promoted
worlds in BelWu, so the Sim function must reach outside of BelWu to find Pro-
moted worlds; (ii) holds because of (17) and the fact that BelWu contains only
¬Promoted-worlds.
The domain for CFWAs, more generally, comprises (i) the p worlds maxi-
mally similar to worlds in BelS and (ii) BelS itself. By adopting this domain, and
an analogous one for FWAs (see just below), our domain embodies—in a highly
constrained way—Heim’s (1992) and Rubinstein’s (2017) idea that want ascrip-
tions are sometimes evaluated against a superset of the agent’s belief set.
Turn now to FWAs, whose truth conditions are the mirror image of those
for CFWAs:
(19) Truth conditions for CFWAs, informally
If S believes p, ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff:
S prefers what she believeswill happen given that p is true to what she
believeswould happen if ¬p were true.
Take our FWA from above, repeated here:
(1) I want it to rain tomorrow (and I believe it will).
On our view, (1) is true just if I prefer what I believewill happen given that it
will rain tomorrow (the boring company picnic will be canceled) to what I be-
lievewould if it didn’t rain tomorrow (I’d have to go to the picnic).
To see why these are the truth conditions, run the mirror of the reasoning
we ran for CFWAs. What you’ll conclude is this: While the domain in general
for CFWAs is BelS plus the p worlds maximally similar to BelS (BelS is coun-
terfactual with respect to S’s beliefs), the domain for FWAs is BelS plus the ¬p
worlds maximally similar to BelS (BelS is factual with respect to p).
5.3 Summing up
Let us zoom out. Our proposed domain is ConBelS(p) ∪ ConBelS(¬p). The makeup
of this set differs among non-(C)FWAs, CFWAs, and FWAs. Specifically, the do-
main takes the following forms, as we saw in sections 5.1 and 5.2:
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ascription type our domain
non-(C)FWA BelS
FWA BelS and ¬p worlds maximally similar to BelS
(C)FWA BelS and p worlds maximally similar to BelS
The differences between these domains lie in the differences in whether p
and ¬p are respectively indicative or counterfactual with respect to the agent’s
beliefs. In all three of the cases, the agent’s conditional beliefs form the core of
the truth conditions, which we summarize in (20). (Recall that for any proposi-
tion q, ConBelS(q) represents what S believes will (would) happen if q is (were)
true.)
(20) Truth conditions for ‘want’, informally
⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff:
S prefers what she believes will (would) happen if p is (were) true to
what she believes will (would) happen if ¬p is (were) true.
While this fulfills our core goal of solving the problem of (C)FWAs, we would
like, before closing, to address a few issues that will help to better contextualize
our proposal with respect to other ideas, problems, and facts found in the lit-
erature. In particular, we will: clarify the relationship between the role that
conditionals play in our semantics vs. the role they play in Heim’s (section 6);
comment on another problem for the belief-set-based approach to want ascrip-
tions first pointed out by Villalta (2008) (section 7); note how our view might
be generalized to account for want ascriptions involving contextual alternatives
as identified by Villalta (2008) and Lassiter (2011) (section 8); and say a few
words about some ramifications that our proposal has for the broader land-
scape of desire predicates, beyond just ‘want’ (section 9).
6 Conditionals in Heim’s semantics
It is a familiar thought that conditionals are intertwined with the semantics of
‘want’. Indeed, the thought is central to Heim’s approach to ‘want’. She writes:
The analysis of desire verbs I want to pursue here is sketched in
Stalnaker (1984, p. 89): “wanting something is preferring it to cer-
tain relevant alternatives, the relevant alternatives being those pos-
sibilities that the agent believes will be realized if he does not get
what he wants.” An important feature of this analysis is that it sees
a hidden conditional in every desire report. A little more explicitly,
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the leading intuition is that John wants you to leave means that
John thinks that if you leave he will be in a more desirable world
than if you don’t leave. (Heim 1992, p. 39; emphasis ours)
We, of course, agree that there are hidden conditionals within ‘want’ reports;
indeed, Heim’s intuition is our major inspiration. To better understand how
Heim’s view relates to ours, it will help to locate the “hidden conditional” within
her semantics.
Heim states her semantics in a dynamic framework. Stated in a static frame-
work, and with our nomenclature, the semantics is this. Wherew <S w′ means
that S prefersw tow′:
(21) Heim’s semantics18JS wants pK = 1 iff ∀w ∈ BelS:Simw(BelS ∩ p) <S Simw(BelS ∩ ¬p).
Put into words: ⌜S wants p⌝ is true just if, for every worldw in S’s belief set, S
prefers the closest world in her belief set where p is true to the closest world in
her belief set where ¬p is true.
Now, let us identify just where the “hidden conditional” lies within this se-
mantics. We can, as we did with von Fintel’s semantics, factor Heim’s seman-
tics into three parts:
(5) Form of a Semantics for ‘Want’JS wants pK = 1 iff S prefers the p worlds in D to the ¬p worlds in D.
(6) Belief Set Domain
D = BelS.
(7) Heimian Preference in a Domain
S prefers the p worlds in D to the ¬p worlds in D iff ∀w ∈ D:
Simw(D ∩ p) <S Simw(D ∩ ¬p).
On this way of viewing Heim’s semantics, the “hidden conditional” is in
the notion of preference within a domain. We, in contrast, propose a condi-
tional in the construction of the domain. And our view is compatible with the
Heimian preference within a domain (just as it’s compatible with a best-worlds
notion of preference in a domain).19
18Heim’s Sim returns multiple worlds rather than just one (see footnote 15), and she uses
not Bel but rather a superset of it that screens off intention-grounded beliefs (see footnote 6).
These differences are not relevant here.
19How to adjudicate between best-worlds preference and Heimian preference? One con-
sideration is that the two approaches make different predictions about the monotonicity of
want ascriptions. Questions about monotonicity are well beyond the scope of this paper (see
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7 Villalta’s problem
Although we have solved the (C)FWA problem, one that vexed the belief-set
approach, we inherit, and do not solve, another problem that the belief-set
approach faces. This other problem, identified by Villalta (2008), is that the
belief-set approach validates the following inference:
(22) a. S wants p.
b. S believes that p iff q.
c. ⇒ S wants q.
The inference in (22) runs counter to intuition. The following instance of (22),
for example, is not good reasoning:
(23) a. Johnson wants to eat pizza.
b. Johnson believes that he’ll get heartburn iff he eats pizza.
c. ⇒ Johnson wants to have heartburn.
If the want ascriptions in question are non-(C)FWAs, then our semantics faces
the problem: it incorrectly validates the invalid inferences. This is because with
non-(C)FWAs, our semantics is exactly the same as the belief-set-based seman-
tics. In other words, the domain is the belief set.
Suppose, for example, that (23-a) and (23-c) are non-(C)FWAs. (Imag-
ine that Johnson will eat pizza if it’s available, but he’s unsure if it’s available,
and so unsure if he’ll eat it.) On our view, the domain for a non-(C)FWA is the
agent’s belief set. So, by (23-a), pizza worlds are best in Johnson’s belief set; by
(23-b), the pizza worlds in Johnson’s belief set are heartburn worlds; so, heart-
burn worlds are best in Johnson’s belief set, which is to say that (23-c) is true.
Happily, there are various solutions to this problem that can be combined
with our view: the semantics of Crnič (2011), Phillips-Brown (2018, ms), and
Dandelet (ms).20 Each of these semantics says that the domain contains not
Crnič 2011 for discussion), and we do not want to take an official stance on this thorny issue.
We can, however, point out one connection that our proposal bears to the debate. von Fintel
(1999) argues that apparent cases of non-monotonicity in desire ascriptions are monotonic af-
ter all, once we take into account how the domain of a desire ascription shifts with the context.
One way in which this can happen is when the agent’s beliefs change: on the belief-set-based
approach, this has a concomitant effect on the domain of the desire ascription. But not all ap-
parent cases of non-monotonicity in desire ascriptions are attributable to changes in belief,
and some such cases are argued by von Fintel (1999), building on prior work by Linebarger
(1987), to involve implicit conditionalization. Our conditional-belief domain, when coupled
with best-worlds preference, can be viewed as a continuation in this vein, fleshing out one way
in which the domain can shift from one desire ascription to the next: moving from a (C)FWA to
a non-(C)FWA or vice versa, even as the agent’s belief set is held constant.
20As mentioned in section 3, Rubinstein (2017) also offers a solution to Villalta’s problem,
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possible worlds, but rather entities of some other, coarser kind: situations (see
e.g. Kratzer 2019), possibilities (see e.g. Humberstone 1981), or propositions,
depending on which of the authors you ask. We won’t go into the details, but
one may use our basic, conditional-belief recipe for constructing the domain
with any of these views, substituting worlds (from our view) with any of these
other types of entities.
8 Contextual alternatives: How to generalize our view
Our domain for ⌜S wants p⌝ is generated simply by the prejacent and its nega-
tion: it represents S’s conditional beliefs about p and about ¬p. Data from Vil-
lalta (2008) and Lassiter (2011), however, suggest the connection between the
prejacent and its negation (on the one hand) and the domain (on the other)
may not be quite so simple. In this section, we present Villalta’s data and pro-
pose a generalization of our view that can accommodate it.
Here is a case structurally analogous to one of Villalta’s (on her p. 469). Poe
is the Secretary of State, and he prefers diplomacy to violence. The President,
however, is a hawk. The country faces two enemies: the pretty bad guys and
the really bad guys. Poe had proposed to the President three options, which in
descending order of Poe’s preference are: negotiate with the really bad guys,
bomb the really bad guys, bomb the pretty bad guys. The President immedi-
ately dismisses the idea of negotiating with the really bad guys and says she’ll
soon decide between the remaining two options. Where all caps indicates
emphasis:
(24) Poe wants to bomb the REALLY BAD GUYS.
(25) Poe wants to BOMB the really bad guys.
One can hear (24) as true and (25) as false. The reason for this is fairly intu-
itive: in (24), emphasis on really bad guys evokes a comparison to bombing
the pretty bad guys, whereas in (25), emphasis on bomb evokes a comparison
to negotiating with the really bad guys. Spelling this out a bit more, (24) is true
because Poe prefers what he believes will happen if he bombs the really bad
guys (loss of life) to a certain contextual alternative—what he believes will hap-
pen if he bombs the pretty bad guys (loss of life, but more gratuitous because
the pretty bad guys are only pretty bad, rather than really bad). In contrast,
(25) is false, one feels, because Poe disprefers what he believes will happen if
one that involves giving want ascriptions an underspecified, context-dependent domain. For
the reasons articulated in that section, however, we do not adopt this solution.
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he bombs the really bad guys (loss of life) to a different contextual alternative
than before—in this case, the alternative is what he believes will happen if he
negotiates with the really bad guys (no loss of life).
Our blueprint for constructing the domain cannot straightforwardly ac-
count for this type of sensitivity to contextual alternatives. Our domain sim-
ply compares p to ¬p; there is no room for the type of shift in alternatives that
Poe’s case suggests. Fortunately, there is a straightforward way to generalize
our blueprint that can account for this, a generalization that preserves our
core insight that conditional belief is central to constructing the domain. We
postulate—as Villalta, Levinson, and Anand and Hacquard (2013) do—a con-
textually determined set of propositions, Ac, against which ⌜S want p⌝ is evalu-
ated in a context c. The domain needn’t represent S’s conditional beliefs about
p and ¬p in every context, but rather her conditional beliefs about each mem-
ber of Ac (which in certain contexts may well include only p and ¬p). Specifi-
cally, where Dc is the domain in c:
(26) Generalized Conditional Belief Domain
Dc =
⋃{ConBelS(q) | q ∈ Ac}
This account can capture the intuitive diagnosis of Poe’s case. In the con-
text c where (24) is true, Ac is {bomb the really bad guys, bomb the pretty bad
guys}, and so Dc is
⋃{ConBelPoe(bomb the really bad guys), ConBelPoe(bomb
the pretty bad guys)}. This is to say that the domain represents what Poe be-
lieves will happen if he bombs the really bad guys and what he believes will
happen if he bombs the pretty bad guys—exactly what we were looking for.
In the context c′ where (25) is false Ac′ is {bomb the really bad guys, negoti-
ate with the pretty bad guys}, and so Dc′ is
⋃{ConBelPoe(bomb the really bad
guys), ConBelPoe(negotiate with the really bad guys)}. In other words, the do-
main represents what Poe believes will happen if he bombs the really bad guys
and what he believes will happen if he negotiates with them—again, exactly
what we were looking for.21
This is how we can account for Villalta’s alternative-sensitive data (and
Levinson’s too, although we won’t go into that here). We can account for all
of the data we’ve encountered previously, too, because when Ac = {p,¬p}, the
21Ultimately, a comprehensive treatment would need to show how Ac/Ac′ is determined not
just by the discourse context but also by the intonational emphasis in the want ascription being
evaluated. We do not undertake this here, because it would take us too far afield, but the point
to be stressed is that the kind of pattern we see here instantiates a much broader linguistic phe-
nomenon known as focus sensitivity (see Villalta 2008 for discussion and references), so what
we are suggesting here recycles technology independently needed elsewhere in the grammar.
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new, generalized domain,⋃{ConBelS(p), ConBelS(¬p)}, is exactly the same
set as our previous domain, ConBelS(p) ∪ ConBelS(¬p). We’d like to tenta-
tively propose—following Anand and Hacquard (2013), whose semantics is
alternative-sensitive, albeit within a different framework—that the default for
Ac is {p,¬p}, and so the default domain is our previous domain.
In the next section we will, for ease of exposition, return to discussing the
previous domain, but what we say applies just as well to this generalized do-
main.
9 The landscape of desire predicates
What is the analytical relationship between ‘want’ and its cousins ‘wish’, ‘be
glad (that)’, and ‘hope’? Our proposal enables the view that all four of these
predicates share the same core semantics, including the conditional belief do-
main:
(27) Form of a semantics for ‘wants’/‘hopes’/‘wishes’/‘is glad that’JS {wants/hopes/wishes/is glad that} pK = 1 iff S prefers the p worlds
in D to the ¬p worlds in D.
(28) Conditional belief domain for ‘wants/‘hopes’/‘wishes’/‘is glad that’
D = ConBelS(p) ∪ ConBelS(¬p)
= {w′ | ∃w ∈ BelS:Simw(p) = w′} ∪ {w′ | ∃w ∈ BelS:Simw(¬p) = w′}
(29) Best-worlds preference in a domain for ‘wants’/‘hopes’/‘wishes’/‘is
glad that’
S prefers the p worlds in D to the ¬p worlds in D iff ∀w ∈ bestS(D):
p(w) = 1.
What distinguishes these four desire predicates from each other (or at least,
one crucial dimension along which they are distinguished) are the presupposi-
tions that they impose on the relationship between p and S’s belief set. ‘Want’
has no such presupposition, whereas—in line with much previous literature—
‘wish’ presupposes that S does not believe p, ‘be glad’ presupposes that S does
believe p, and ‘hope’ presupposes that S neither believes p nor believes ¬p:
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(30) Doxastic presuppositions of desire predicates
‘want’ none
‘wish’ S believes ¬p BelS ⊆ ¬p
‘be glad’ S believes p BelS ⊆ p
‘hope’ S neither believes p nor ¬p BelS ⊈ p ∧ BelS ⊈ ¬p
These doxastic presuppositions interact with our uniform Conditional Be-
lief Domain to ensure that the domain for ‘hope’ ends up simply being S’s belief
set, while the domain for ‘wish’ ends up being S’s belief set expanded to include
maximally similar p worlds, and the domain for ‘be glad’ ends up being S’s be-
lief set expanded to include maximally similar ¬p worlds.
That the domain for ‘hope’, unlike ‘want’, is S’s belief set and that ‘hope’ but
not ‘want’ requires the subject to believe the desired proposition to be possible
finds support in such previous work as Portner (1992); Portner and Rubinstein
(2012); Anand and Hacquard (2013); Silk (2018); Blumberg (ms). Compare,
for example, Heim’s (3), repeated below, and a variant with ‘hope’ in place of
‘want’:
(3) Iwant this weekend to last forever (but of course I know it will be over
in a few hours).
(31) ??I hope this weekend will last forever (but of course I know it will be
over in a few hours).
As we know, (3) does not to commit the speaker to belief in the possibility
of a never-ending weekend; she believes that the weekend will soon be over. In
contrast, (31) is infelicitous exactly because the ‘hope’ ascription does seem to
commit the speaker to the possibility of a never-ending weekend, which is what
she disavows in the parenthetical.
Moreover, our domains for ‘wish’ and ‘be glad’ end up being essentially the
same as what Heim (1992) proposes for these two predicates, though we im-
prove on her approach in that we derive these domains from the interaction
between their doxastic presuppositions and a uniform domain rather than stip-
ulating these domains lexically for each predicate.
Our rethinking of the boundaries between these four desire predicates does
raise an important question. It is well documented that when two lexical items
differ only in such a way that one is presuppositionally stronger, the presup-
positionally weaker member typically comes across as infelicitous in contexts
where the stronger presupposition is satisfied—this is Heim’s (1991) Maximize
Presupposition. Observe, for example, the following sentences. In each case,
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choosing the first word in the disjunct sounds odd because there is an alterna-
tive word that better satisfies uncontroversial background assumptions (that
there is only one sun, that I have exactly two eyes, and that 2+2=4, respec-
tively).
(32) Examples of Maximize Presupposition
a. {??A/The} sun is shining.
b. {??All/Both} of my eyes are closed.
c. John {??believes/knows} that 2+2=4.
Why, then, is ‘want’ possible even in contexts where the presuppositions of
‘wish’, ‘be glad’, or ‘hope’ would be satisfied? We begin by noting that under
some conditions, it may be possible to detect a kind of weak Maximize Pre-
supposition effect. Blumberg (ms), for example, says that it would be odd to
say ‘Bill knows that Mary has a terminal illness. Hewants her to get better.’
(compare: ‘…Hewishes she could get better.’), and even invokes Maximize
Presupposition to explain why it is odd. But the effect, if there is one, is rather
weak, and we suspect that it may reflect a stylistic preference (think of a careful
writer wanting to choose the most appropriate, most precise word) rather than
being the business of grammar. And we furthermore suspect that the reason
for this is that there are additional semantic differences distinguishing ‘want’
from its presuppositionally stronger counterparts that prevent genuine Maxi-
mize Presupposition competition.
While it will be beyond the scope of this paper to explore these semantic
differences in detail, we can offer some suggestive data that illustrate some of
them. As for ‘want’ vs. ‘hope’, Portner and Rubinstein (2012) note, for example,
the contrast in acceptability between the two predicates in
(33) He doesn’t fully realize it yet, but Ronwants/??hopes to date Hermione.
(p. 471)
which persists even on the assumption that Ron believes dating Hermione to
be a possibility. Portner and Rubinstein’s own proposal is that ‘hope’ but not
‘want’ involves the agent’s contextual commitment to a preference, one require-
ment of which is the agent’s own awareness of the preference. Regardless of
whether we adopt this particular approach, though, the crucial point is that
‘want’ differs from ‘hope’ in ways that prevent Maximize Presupposition com-
petition.
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As for ‘want’ vs. ‘be glad’, we note the following FWA due to Iatridou:
(34) I live in Bolivia because Iwant to live in Bolivia. (Iatridou 2000:243)
Observe that its ‘be glad’ counterpart sounds quite odd:
(35) ??I live in Bolivia because I am glad that I live in Bolivia.
The same contrast is apparent in comparing Heim’s (1992) FWA (see footnote
6 above) with its ‘be glad’ variant:
(36) John hired a babysitter because he {wants to go/??is glad that he’ll
go} to the movies tonight.
For reasons that are not entirely clear to us, it appears that states of wanting
can be used in because-clauses to explain certain kinds of behavior (living in
Bolivia, hiring a babysitter) in ways that states of being glad cannot. What-
ever the reason is, it points to some semantic difference between ‘want’ and ‘be
glad’—beyond what they presuppose or not about the agent’s belief set— that
plausibly blocks Maximize Presupposition competition.
Finally, what about ‘want’ vs. ‘wish’? We are not aware of any CFWA that
cannot be felicitously paraphrased with a wish ascription. Take, for example,
(37), just below, which can be felicitously paraphrased by its ‘wish’ counterpart,
(38):
(37) Iwant this weekend to last forever.
(38) Iwish this weekend would last forever.
But in general the reverse is not true. Specifically, wish ascriptions can be
used for preferences about past counterfactual scenarios, for example:
(39) ‘Iwish I had been there yesterday.’
Here in (39), a want paraphrase sounds rather awkward:
(40) ‘??Iwant to have been there yesterday.’
This suggests that ‘want’ but not ‘wish’ comes with the requirement that the
desired proposition must be temporally simultaneous or future-oriented with
respect to the time of the desire. And we suggest that this difference—or what-
ever more fundamental difference might be responsible for it—may account for
the lack of Maximize Presupposition competition between ‘want’ and ‘wish’.
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10 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to revise the belief-set approach to want ascriptions
in a way that solves the well-known problem of (C)FWAs, while doing as little
damage as possible to all of the virtues of the belief-set approach. Indeed, the
persistence of the belief-set approach in spite of its well-known shortcoming is
a testament to the many results that it does get right, and we offer the proposal
in this paper as one among many contributions leading to a more sophisticated,
more accurate version of the belief-set approach.
In carrying out our goal, we have shown that conditional belief—and more
specifically a model of conditional belief inspired by Stalnaker’s approach to
conditional sentences—offers an elegant way of unifying non-(C)FWAs, CFWAs,
and FWAs under a single semantics that strikes the right balance between
rigidity and flexibility in characterizing the domain.
Finally, we have reflected on the consequences of our proposal for rethink-
ing the boundary between ‘want’ in relation to its cousins ‘hope’, ‘wish’, and ‘be
glad’, in ways that contribute to increasingly fine-grained and accurate lexical
semantics for desire predicates.
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